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On ne peut pas pretendre non plus que tout autre employeur,
place dans une meme situation de faits, n'aurait pu obtenir de
meilleurs resultats dans ses demarches.
Si tant est que la defense d'impossibilite puisse a l'occasion
constituer un moyen de defense valable contre une infraction
de ce genre, j'en viens a la conclusion ici que l'appelante n'a
pas fait la demonstration d'une impossibilite qui puisse donner
ouverture a pareille excuse.

Par ces motifs, le tribunal declare l'~inculpee coupable de !'infraction et la condamne aux frais du present appel.
Vu qu'il n'y a pas appel de la peine imposee, le tribunal rend
executoire immediatement la peine imposee en premiere instance.

AN EVIDENCE CODE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
by
PAUL ROTHSTEIN*

An address opening the Conference on Current Trends
in !ENidence, Dalhous,ie University, 26th November
197,6**

Let me say how pleased I am to be here in Canada and how
pleased I am at the hospitality that's been shown me thus far.
I think it's most indulgent of you to consider the American
Evidence Code which, I think, does have more relevance than
might appear at first glance. This is because our Code, called
the Federal Rules of Evidence, is about 50 per cent or perhaps
even 60 or 70 per cent, the same as your proposed Code. Much
of it ~is almost verbatim.
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., author
of books and articles on evidence and trials, advisor to the United
States Senate Judiciary Committee in a number of projects, including
the Federal Rules of Evidence, consultant and reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and various law revision and legal education projects.
**Editor's note: Professor Rothstein's address was the first of a group
of excellent addresses given at the conference by practitioners, judges
and professors concerning the present law of evidence and the Law
Reform Commission of Canada's Evidence Code. These papers will
be published shortly in book form and will be available from the
Public Services Committee at Dalhousie Law School.
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We have had this Code in operation now in the United States
for about a year and a half. So in many ways it's a little early
to be examining its effects. Nevertheless we do have some
base of experience under it, from which to speak.
I am going to be somewhat unorthodox and take things out
of order. I will reserve discussion of the background of our
Code, how it came to be, and what courts it governs, until the
end of my remarks. Right now I will discuss a specific area
of our Code, the sections dealing with expert testimony and
opinion evidence which are almost precisely identical in our
Code and your proposed Code. In our Code it's called Article
7. You will understand that when I refer to Article 7, I am
also referring to your sections 6,7 to 73, which are the analogous sections.
I will not say now why I am going to take things out of
order. That will emerge as we proceed.
PROVISIONS ON OPINIONS AND ExPERTS

Let me briefly outline how Article 7 and your analogous
provisions operate. I will, in this outline, present a composite
picture which includes a reading of the sections in Article 7
as they operate together as an integrated whole, rather than a
section-by-section treatment. The picture will also be based on
relevant case interpretations, which I assume would be similar
under your Code.
Proceeding, then, along these lines, reading Article 7 from
its four corners, putting it all together and cranking into it
the case interpretations, I see in Article 7 and your analogous
provisions seven great liberalizations over traditional existing
evidence law in the area of experts and opinions. By liberalization, I mean a broadening, an increase in admissibility.
The first great liberalization has to do with lay opinions.
Lay opinions under the new Code are allowed whenever they
would be "helpful", provided that they are rationally based in
the witness's perception. All that latter requirement means
is that the witness must have first-hand, personal knowledge
of the matter that he is speaking about. Thus, we now allow into
evidence opinions on the part of lay persons, in a much freer
fashion than formerly. No longer is the rule the traditional
restrictive "collective facts" rule. That was the former rule
in the United States that a lay person could only express an
opinion on the stand if it wa:s impossible or terribly imprac-
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tical to express what he has observed in any other fashion. A
lay person was allowed to say that so-and-,so was joking; that
so-and-so looked like he wa:s dying; that such-and-such produce was rotten; that such-and-such was a strong fence or a
strong person; or that so-and-so appeared sane. These are all
conclusions, inferences or opinions, and they would have been
barred but for the fact that they were held to come within
the collective facts rule. They a:re a shorthand rendition of
some underlying, practically inarticulable facts.
The only
time a lay person could express an opinion was when a shorthand rendition was absolutely necessary and essential and very
difficult or impossible to express any other way. This is no
longer the law. The new rule permits the opinion whenever
the opinion would be "helpful". This is the very word used.
The second great liberalizaton expands who will be considered "experts". The category will include not just professionals, scientists and people with specialized university degrees.
It will include also the so-called "skilled" witnesses, such as
bankers, farmers, police patrolmen or home owners, testifying
in the,ir particular area of experience.
The third great liberalization expands what subjects are
proper subjects for expert testimony. It used to be in the
United States that the only proper subjects for expert testimony were matters that were totally beyond lay ken. That's
the way the test read, totally beyond lay ken. If a lay person
knew anything about the area, had any knowledge in the area,
then an expert could not testify in that area. Such testimony
would be considered an invasion of the province of the jury.
The new test is that an expert may testify in any area where
he has "specialized knowledge" which would be "of assistance"
to the jury or to the judge - a very broad, liberal, highly
discretionary test.
The fourth great liberalization has to do with the much
maligned and much touted hypothetical question. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and your analogous provisions, no
longer need expert testimony be presented in the stilted format
of the hypothetical question. A hypothetical question usually
takes something like the following form: "Now, assuming,
doctor, that a patient comes to you with such-and-such and
so-and-so and has a history of such-and-such and so-and-so,
do you have an opinion, doctor, as to whether this will be
permanent?" "Yes, I do." "What is that opinion?" (These
hypothetical questions often run on for pages and pages,
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Lawyers are fond of building into the hypothetical every conceivable favourable fact in the case, using this as early argumentation and propaganda.) No longer is that a necessary
format for expressing expert opinion.
There are now six alternative formats. I am putting together the cases and the wording of several of the sections
in the Article. The six alternative formats are these: first
of all, the traditional hypothetical given at trial; secondly, a
hypothetical given to the expert before trial, perhaps in the
privacy of the lawyers office, the expert then testifying on
the stand based on that; thirdly, the expert's testimony can be
based upon personal knowledge, fo~ example, he may be a doctor who has made a personal examination of the patient and
he testifies based upon that; fourthly, he might testify based
upon reading the transcript in the case; fifthly, he may testify
based on his attendance at the trial, sitting in the audience
and listening to the fact witnesses; and sixthly, he can testify
based upon a mixture of any of the above. Thus, the stilted
hypothetical question is no longer a necessity.
The fifth great liberalization is that an expert on the stand
may rely on unadmitted and inadmissible materials in giving
his opinion if they are of the kind that are "reasonably relied
upon" by experts In the ,field. Thus he may base his opinion
on inadmissible evidence, hearsay, documents that are not in
evidence, documents that violate the best evidence or the
authentication rule - any kind of inadmissible evidence provided that it is the kind that is "reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming inferences or opinions
on the subject." Thus, a judgment of reasonableness has to be
made here by the judge. A question could be raised: "Reasonable for whom? - the court or these experts?" ; "Reasonableness" has usually been held synonymous with ·"customary".
You will notice that this principle is an end run around the
hearsay rule. If an attorney has a piece of hearsay and has
trouble getting it into evidence under the hearsay rule and
cannot find an exception to the hearsay rule for it, then he
might endeavour to find an expert who will base his opinion
on the inadmissible hearsay. The attorney might then put the
expert on the stand to recount not only his opinion but also the
hearsay basis of his opinion. This has tremendous implications
for getting into evidence studies; polls; surveys; second-hand
statements, say, by patients, consultations with other doctors;
books; articles; and other things of that sort that might otherwise be inadmissible hearsay.
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A primordial case interpreting this provision came down
some months back. A police officer from the drug enforcement
administration was allowed to testify as to the selling price of
heroin in various cities of the world. He had found out the
prices from other agents. Subsequent cases admitted studies government studies, private studies, university studies - and
polls and surveys, even though the hearsay rule would have
barred them. The idea is not new, but the new rules button
it down.
The sixth great liberalization has to do with disclosure of the
facts and materials upon which the expert witness bases his
opinion. It used to be in the United States, and probably here
as well, that it was required that the expert give the basis for
his opinion in the direct examination, so that the cross-examiner had some advanced warning and could decide whether or
not to cross-examine, and if he decided to cross-examine, what
tack to take. Sometimes it's the better part of discretion not
to cross-examine an articulate expert. Our rules of evidence
now say that this is no longer required; that the direct examination does not need to include the basis of the expert's
opinion. The expert can give a bare opinion. Admittedly, in
many cases the direct examiner will not proceed this way because a bare opinion is not very persuasive. But on occasion
the direct examiner will not put a basis in on the direct examination, either because there is no very good basis or because there is a great basis and he would like the cross-examiner to trigger it. He may know from past experience with
this cross-examiner that he can depend upon the cross-examiner
to do just that. The cross-examiner can't keep his mouth shut.
If the cross-examiner triggers the basis, it's very effective for
the direct examiner, because it makes the expert look especially
good, much better than if the basis had been put in on the
direct examination. Under the new rule it is no longer required
to put the basis in during the direct examination.
Your rule is a little better on this score than ours. Your
rule provides that the judge may or may not order that the
basis be put in on the direct examination, and does not slant
the language to indicate that such an order is the extraordinary
case. In addition, yours provides for the parties to exchange in
advance written summaries of expert testimony and its grounds,
something that appears in our civil procedure law (but not our
criminal procedure law). This has often proved inadequate because the statement in practice is frequently perfunctory.
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The seventh great liberalization has to do with the so-called
ultimate issue rule. This was the rule that provided that an
opinion, be it an expert opinion or a lay opinion, could not be
given in terms that smacked of, that sounded of, an ultimate
issue in the case. This has been abolished by our new rules
and your proposed rules. There is no longer a ban on opinions
by experts or lay people expressed in terms of the ultimate issue in the case.
That is the final liberalization that I want to address in outlining the way that these provisions operate.
Let us see how these seven great liberalizations interrelate
with each other to produce results in particular cases. Let
us take an automobile accidentologist. We seem to have a
growing class of people called accident reconstruction experts
in the United States, accidentologists, in many different areas,
including industrial mishaps and collisions. Let us say that he
wants to take the stand to testify about who caused an automobile accident. And he wants to say the Ford was at fault,
or wasn't keeping a proper lookout. He wants to testify based
not upon any personal observation that he had of the automobile accident, but based primarily upon bystanders' statements. He has interviewed the bystanders and they tell him
lots of things. He puts them all together. Are there any impediments to this sort of thing coming in? It seems to be hearsay; and he seems to be an expert of somewhat specious qualifications. Nevertheless with an appropriate judge he could over,come all the hurdles and get his evidence in. He could, first
of all, convince the judge that this is a recognized field of expertise that has something "helpful", something "of assistance",
to offer the trier of fact. He could) convince the judge that he
does indeed have some "specialized knowledge". That's all
that's required under the rule regarding his qualifications and
the area he can testify in. It seems to me that he could convince the judge that it would be more "helpful", of more "assistance", to have this testimony than to not have it. So he
meets that test. In addition, we have learned that he is allowed to base his testimony on hearsay, provided that he convinces
the judge that experts in this field reasonably rely upon this
kind of hearsay, bystanders' statements. Let us say that he
does so convince the judge. He says, "All us accidentologists
rely all the time on this kind of bystanders' statements." The
final impediment seems to be that he is expressing his conclusion in terms of the ultimate issue in the case. He says the
Ford was at fault; the Ford didn't keep a proper lookout. Well,
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we saw that there is no longer a ban on ultimate opinions, opiQ
nions on the ultimate issue in the case. So he overcomes that
hurdle too.
One additional hurdle might be mentioned. We have something in our rules near the outset, rule 403 (you have an analogous rule), which I call "the big override". It states that
notwithstanding anything else the rules provide, the judge can
keep evidence out if in his discretion he finds that the probativity is substantially outweighed by the prejudice, the time
consumption, the confusion, the misleadingness or similar factors. This is a very broad rule, phrased just like that, and the
judge has discretion tq exercise it. But it seems to me that a
judge might well decide - having made all these determinations that Article 7 relating to experts is complied with in
the case of this accidentologist - that the "big override",
rule 403, is also complied with. He would admit the testimony
into evidence. (While the drafter's comments try to assure
us that it is not contemplated that such evidence should be
admitted, there are no assurances in the text of the rules.)
Let us take another case. Suppose a financial investigator
from our Internal Revenue Service (our income tax people)
takes the stand to testify that Mr. so-and-so is guilty of tax
fraud, in just those terms. His conclusion, let us further assume, is based upon his examination of bank records, i.e.,
doucuments that are not here, haven't been admitted, may not
even be admissible, are not authenticated and don't comply
with the best evidence rule. They may be hearsay and may
not really meet the requirements of any exception, for all we
know. And he works for the government - a party in interest. The rules are broad enough to permit this testimony,
even though he is expressing an ultimate opinion that so-andso is guilty of tax fraud.
A fortiori he could testify that Mr. so-and-so owns certain
funds.' Let us say that is an important allegation in the case;
that they are the defendant's funds and that the defendant
tried to cover them up by all kinds of dummy corporations.
The investigator could testify in terms of these allegations that the funds were Mr. so-and-so's, who tried to cover up
with dummy corporations. The expert may never specify any
facts underlying such a conclusion. Hopefully judges will not
allow what we have been talking about, but there is a risk
some will.
The witness is testifying based upon inadmissible or unadmitted evidence, but there is no ban on that. There is no
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ban on ultimate conclusions. He is a specialist who has speGialized knowledge. The judge could feel it is helpful and of assistance to the trier of facts. So it all may come in.
I take it you now have a feeling of disquietude and discomfort. Which brings us to my first reason for putting the early
spotlight on Article 7, dealing with opinions and experts. It
is my conviction that Article 7 will be the most important
article in all the rules in 20th century and 21st century litigation. In today's world of increasing expertise and specialization, and increasingly complex technical issues that are beyond
the ability of lay juries to resolve or to resolve expeditiously
without expert help, expert testimony will be relied upon more
and more as time goes on. At one and the same time Article
7 has the greatest potential for good and also the greatest
potential for harm and abuse in all the rules.
On the good side, Article 7 opens the door to all sorts of
valuable modern expertise which the courts have been barring
by applying 18th century precedents to today's vastly more
complex problems. Article 7 thus laudably brings courts into
the 20th century. But in opening the door wider to expertise,
more charlatans are also going to get in. There will be an
avalanche of sociologists, economists, safety experts, employment discrimination experts, psychologists, etc. - some of
them good and some of them bad. These rules give the court
no concrete guidance in distinguishing the charlatans from the
savants. Now, of course, a top-notch judge usually can distinguish between them under the standards provided in the
rules. But in any system of law, are all the judges going to
be top-notch? And we should remember that in the United
States, while these rules bind only federal judges, they are
being adopted in an increasing rate by the states. Many states
that haven't adopted them are using them in an advisory
fashion. In addition, administrative agencies are using them
in an advisory capacity. Eventually many administrative agencies will probably adopt them. Especially with respect to the
states, you have to realize that judges who are on a very high
level, and judges on the lower levels, are going to be using
these rules. Both your highest, most learned judges and your
J.P.'s are going to be using these rules.
What the rules are saying here, and what I've illustrated
with the accidentologist case and the bank examiner case, is
that the rules ask you to trust the judge, trust the jury and
trust the lawyers. Trust the judge to keep out unworthy ev-
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idence. Trust the jury to spot weaknesses in evidence that is
admitted and to assess its weight correctly. Most importantly,
trust the lawyers to point out the weaknesses in the evidence
so that the judge and jury can spot them. So there is a heavy
onus on the lawyers when these rules go into effect.
It's obvious that the quality of the bench and bar is critical
under these new rules. I know the quality of our federal bench
and our federal bar and I know that <it is very high. I assume
the same is true of the courts that will be using your proposed
rules. I leave it to you as to whether you feel that these provisions that I've outlined can be administered properly. I might
point out that while these rules may seem to give the judge
too much flexibility, I would warn against the opposite extreme - a rigid specification that unduly hems him in. I leave
it to you to ask yourselves whether you think these provisions
that I have outlined draw the right balance between too much
rigid specificity (which would unduly tie the hands of the
judge) and uncontrolled discretion. Do they draw the line
between the two in the proper place?
TRENDS IN THE RULES AS A WHOLE

All of this brings me to my main reason for addressing
Article 7, dealing with opinions and experts. My main reason
is this: that what is true of Article 7, in the senses that I have
addressed, is also true throughout the entire body of the rules,
both yours and ours. I see two themes in the new rules, yours
and ours, that are strongly illustrated by Article 7 and the analogous provisions in your Code. These two themes are admissibility and discretion. Throughout their length and breadth
these rules favour admissibility and grant strong doses of discretion.
Admissibility is manifest right in the fundamental definition
of relevance in both Codes. Your Code says relevant evidence
is evidence that has any tendency in reason to persuade. This
is a very low threshold favouring admissibility. Ours says any
evidence that has any tendency to increase in any degree the
probability of a provable proposition being true or untrue is
relevant. All it has to do is increase or decrease the probability in any degree- a fraction of 1 per cent -and it's relevant. In addition, before the judge can exclude evidence pursuant to the "big override" referred to earlier, he must find
that the relevance, or probativity, is substantially outweighed
- not just outweighed - by the other policy factors (time
prejudice, etc.). This is so in both Codes.
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The admissibility theme is further illustrated in both Codes
by the fact that they severely limit witness incompetencies. And
both allow you to impeach your own witness, contrary to former law. Both substantially erode the hearsay rule. The authentication of documents requirement is whittled down in both.
There is an expanded list of self-authenticating documents, documents that on their face are authenticated. The best evidence rule is radically altered - xeroxes, photocopies, are freely admitted on a par with originals in most cases.
All this means admissibility. And there are many, many
more provisions that increase admissibility, in addition to the
opinions and experts sections that I previously addressed.
What about the theme of discretion? The knell of discretion is sounded near the very beginning of your rules and
ours, in what I have called the "big override", which grants
the judge wide discretion to balance probativity against prejudice, time consumption, misleadingness and similar factors.
In another section in both Codes the judge is given discretion
over the order and manner of presentation of evidence and
the examination of witnesses. That's your rule 58- we have
the same thing. This means he has discretion over the scope
of cross-examination, the scope and permissibility of rebuttal
and surrebuttal, the number of witnesses and things of that
nature. And he has in both Codes discretion over whether or
not and when to allow leading questions. He's given some
guidance but not too much.
Your privilege provisions are a prime example of what we
are addressing at this point. Under some of the privilege provisions in your Code the judge is to weigh the need for the
testimony against the public interest in privacy. Under others
he is to weigh the public interest in privacy against the public interest in the administration of justice. Under your sections on illegally obtained evidence, he is to balance human
dignity, social values and the administration of justice against
the seriousness of the case and the need for the evidence. At
one point under illegally obtained evidence, the judge is to
gauge whether the administration of justice would be thrown
into disrepute, a factor which cuts both ways, depending upon
whether one thinks letting a criminal off, or using illegally obtained evidence, is the more disreputable, something upon which
opinion seems divided. I am using the actual words of your
Code. They are broad, engendering much discretion.
Discretion and breadth of phrasing engendering discretion
appear at every turn, not merely in the sections on experts and
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opinions and the other sections I have referred to. Indeed, in
the United 'States people have called our Federal Rules of Evidence the "Federal Non-Rules of Evidence". I think that is an
exaggeration. But rit is true that these rules are actually not
rules but guidelines, standards, only.
These twin themes of admissibility and discretion have certain implications in addition to those I've already mentioned.
The ones I've already mentioned are the three "trusts" (trust
the judge, trust the jury and trust the lawYers) and the importance of the quality of the bench and the bar. Let me mention some other implications.
First of all, it seems to me that broad discretion means that
even under the Code there will still be considerable diversity
from circuit to circuit, district to district, judge to judge, which
rules and codes are meant to eliminate. Discretion and broad
phrases engender differences of opinion as to how it should
be exercised.
Secondly, discretion means that all of evidence law will not
be between the two covers of the Code. Old cases and new
cases will still play a tremendous role, despite some exaggerated promises for a code. It is fatuous to say, as the beginning of your Code seems to imply, that the common law
is abolished. It cannot be abolished where you have broad
provisions and discretion like this. You have got to give such
rules content by reference to the old cases and the new cases.
The next implication that I see ~is that discretion means that
dissatisfied litigants will be able to focus much of their dissatisfaction on the judge personally. He cannot say that the result
was entirely compelled by law. The litigant can say, "Wait a
minute, you've been given tremendous discretion to exercise as
you want here." This is somewhat contrary to the historical
trend toward a rule of law and not of men - a trend that, admittedly, has not been constant and perhaps cannot or should
not be carried to an extreme.
The next implication is that while discretion gives the trial
judge much more latitude than he formerly had, it also gives
some new licence to appellate judges. They will be allowed to
reverse distasteful decisions for nothing more precise than
abuse of discretion, in many instances.
Fifthly, it seems to me that as lawYers, your ability to plan,
predict and advise; to proportion expenses to a case in advance; and to give a reading of what it will cost and of the

An Evidence Code: The American Experience

285

probabilities of outcome, is impaired under a code that gives
broad discretion, because discretion means uncertainty. How
can you precisely plan your case if you don't know what evidence is going to be admissible because it turns on the discretion of the judge? How can you predict for your client with
any degree of probability what the result will be when that
all depends on what evidence is admissible and you don't know
precisely what will be admissible? How can you advise the
client as to whether to go into litigation or not, and how much
to spend? How can you give a reading as to how much it will
cost, and plan the costs? All this depends upon what evidence
will be admitted at trial. You are somewhat impaired to the
extent that there is discretion and uncertainty.
And, finally, there are going to be more appeals, at least
in the short run. You've got a lot of broad phrases; a lot of
discretion. We're going to have to get appellate courts to tell
us what are the limits of the discretion, what is an abuse of
. discretion, what the broad phrases mean. Furthermore, whenever you enact a new code, laWYers have a heightened sense of
the subject, of evidence. For example, in the United States we
have been giving lectures all over the country - laWYers are
suddenly very interested in evidence. They might never have
been interested in it before but we have a new Code, so they're
very interested. Therefore, they study it, they go to seminars.
they read books. They have a heightened awareness of evidence matters. It makes them more appeal-minded. Codes use
new words. Nobody knows for sure what the new words mean.
So they say, "Let's ask the appellate court." There are going
to be more appeals for a while.
This is a pretty gloomy picture. I seem to be saying that the
new rules are and will be a failure; that they will not accomplish what codification is intended to accomplish. But that is
not my message. Rather, I am pleading for a realistic rather
than an exaggerated expectation as to what rules of this kind
will accomplish. They may not accomplish the goals of codification 100 per cent. They may only accomplish it 50 or 70
per cent. Perhaps they will need amending before enactment
and from time to time after enactment as they operate and
problems are revealed. But, nevertheless, codified rules of
evidence of some kind are, on the whole, desirable and salutary
in my view. Codified rules at the very least cause all the judges
to shoot toward the same target. Authority will all be gathered
together in convenient annotations to rules by the glossators.
Law students will study the Code, which is a very effective
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teaching tool. They will probably learn better, and it will be
uniform law they will be learning and subsequently spreading.
They will be equipped to practise under it. It will be a conveniet focus for law schools and for the continuing legal education of practitioners. Interest in learning the law of evidence
with precision will be stimulated. Thus, I think that under a
code, the system will tend towards simplification, uniformity,
professionalism and expedition, though the goals will never be
accomplished 100 per cent.
In the meantime, when a code is adopted, I urge that lawyers
not give up arguing the fine points of interpretation for their
clients and that they not give up engaging in the sophisticated
use and distinguishing of case decisions in order to give content
to generalized words like "helpful", "of assistance" and the
other broad words that constantly recur throughout the Code.
The reason I say that lawyers should continue to do this is so
that the courts may ultimately decide what is the best interpretation of each provision in the Code, and so that the drafters
may make amendments when needed. It is a lawyer's duty, not
only to his client but to society as well, to do this. Only then
can we be confident that the courts have been presented with
all the alternative interpretations of a word or phrase and that
they have been adequately argued. Only then can we feel assured that the court has selected the right alternative and that
we have the best interpretation possible. If this is re-introducing technicality into a code that was meant to sweep away
technicality, then so be it. It is a good thing, I say. And it is
unavoidable in a code using such broad phrases.

I know I don't need to exhort lawyers to do this. A vigorous
bar will do this kind of argumentation wherever there is vagueness or generality in a code or any possible ambiguity. They
will argue the pros and cons of past resolutions from the old
cases and from the common law. And there are bound to be
conflicting cases coming down under the Code which lawyers
can also argue from, because ambiguity, broad phrases, or discretion engender conflicting differences of opinion by different
judges. This process is sometimes referred to as undue technicality. But the needs and problems giving rise to it cannot
be ignored and will not go away. It is unavoidable unless the
Code is so detailed as to answer every question in advance.
Such specificity is impossible and undesirable for a number of
reasons, not the least of which is that the drafters cannot possibly foresee every contingency or be alerted to all the pros and
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cons of every interpretation in advance. Neither Code attempts
anything like that.
SOME EFFECTS ON THE DAY-TO-DAY PRACTICE OF LAW

I would like to turn for a moment to the practical effects that
our Code has had on the practice of litigation law and that your
Code can be expected to have. My own experience, plus my
interviews with other attorneys, tells me that one principal
effect of the new Code is that more preparation of cases is required. Certain sloppy practices which were always dangerous
to the sloppy practitioner who practised them have been rendered doubly dangerous under the Code. This will be true of
your Code as well as ours because the provisions I am going
to address are v;irtually the same.
Let me illustrate what I mean. Your opponents' experts will
no longer have to give you their basis - their materials and
their facts - on the direct examination. I have already adverted to this. It means that if you're going to make an informed decision as to whether or not to cross-examine and what
line of attack to take in your cross-examination, you're going
to have to do some home,work (probably beyond the cursory
summary of expert testimony and grounds your opponent may
have provided). You can't say "I can rely on my wits and listen
to the direct examination, that's enough to supplement the
summary, and I'll fashion my cross-examination on my feet."
You can't do that anymore. I know none of you do this kind
of thing. But some cases aren't expensive enough, do not have
big enough stakes, to warrant spending the client's money on
tremendous pre-trial investigation and discovery; or the client
may be impecunious. So sometimes you will be tempted, perhaps even somewhat justifiably, into one of these practices to
some extent. But it must be recognized that such a practice is
more disadvantageous than ever under the Code. Criminal
cases are especially troublesome on this score in the United
States because pre-trial investigation and discovery by the accused is handicapped not only by lack of funds, normally, but
also by inadequate legal procedures for discovery.
What about opponents' lay witnesses? Can you sit back and
say, "I won't do very much homework and discovery, I'll just
listen to what he says on direct examination and then I'll crossexamine him based on that. I can rely on my wits." Can you
do that safely? No, you can't, because of something that I call
"the case of the invisible witness". It goes as follows. The lay
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witness on the stand may say not "I saw the Ford go through
the red light", but rather "Mr. Jones told me the Ford went
through the red light." You can't cross-examine Mr. Jones. He
isn't here. He's the invisible witness. So you cross-examine
this witness who is on the stand. But the witness on the stand
says "I don't know. Don't ask me those questions. Mr. Jones
said it. I don't know." It is apparent that you can't effectively cross-examine concerning the matter. Now you say to me,
"Wait a minute, that's hearsay." But the point is that the new
Codes, both of them, yours and ours, restrict the hearsay rule.
More of this type of secondhand material by invisible witnesses
is going to get into evidence. Thus, you've been caught unawares. You haven't done your pre-trial discovery and investigation, which would have shown you that this witness is going
to testify to hearsay. It would have identified for you the declarant, Mr. Jones, the invisible witness. Then you could go
get him, depose him, interview him, perhaps bring him to trial,
or at least gather evidence on his credibility and the circumstances surrounding him and the observations he made. If you
had done your homework properly that's what you could do.
But you didn't. You sat back, you said, "Well, I'm going to
learn it all in the direct examination just on my wits, do the
whole case in a really great cross-examination like Perry
Mason." You can't do that with impunity, especially under
the new Code. The cross-examination will be ineffective in this
kind of situation, which can be expected to recur frequently.
Once again, little allowance is made for cases where it may be
impractical or impossible to conduct extensive investigation
and discovery.
To the extent that the Codes provide for notice to the other
side of hearsay that will be used, the problems respecting "invisible witnesses" spoken of above are somewhat, but not entirely, alleviated. While the notice may identify the declarant
(the "invisible witness") and furnish something of the substance of his statement, discovery and investigation is still
needed to ferret out any weaknesses in it, and calling or investigating the declarant still entails trouble and expense and
it may even prove to be impossible. Further, not all situations
where hearsay can be used are covered by the notice requirement, although the notice requirement in your Code is broader
than the one in ours.
What about documents? How about the lawyer who says,
"I'm not going to do too much homework and discovery on
my opponent's documents. When my opponent brings in the
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documents, I'll have enough to prepare a good attack on the
documents. After all, he's got to present me with the original.
The original prevents double xeroxing, reveals any fraudulence, displays for close scrutiny the original signature, reveals any erasures, etc. Furthermore, he's got to present an
authenticating witness for the document, so I'll cross-examine
that authenticating witness and that will reveal any problems.
Why should I do pre-trial discovery, investigation and other
homework?" The problem with this approach is that the new
rules do not require an authenticating witness for an expanded
list of self-authenticating documents, and the new rules do not
require the production of the original. Xeroxes will do the
trick in most cases. So this lawyer is out of luck. Again, it is
probably no excuse that there may have been practical reasons
for failure to investigate and discover, although the judge has
some discretion to require originals.
Turning to the next practice, some of you may have said to
yourself, "I'm not going to waste the client's and my resources
by preparing my own expert witness very thoroughly. After
all, he is extremely intelligent and articulate. I have worked
with him before. He's appeared in cases for me before. I'll
just hand him my file on the case and I'll tell him to go home
and prepare from it. Then he can come and testify. That's
an economical way to do it." This is very risky under the new
Codes, because they provide that documents used by witnesses
to prepare themselves, either before taking the stand or on the
stand, may be inspected by the adverse party. By giving the
witness your case file, you risk exposing it to adverse inspection.
Our Code states that adverse inspection of documents used to
prepare before taking the stand is discretionary with the judge.
Your Code makes it mandatory if requested. So this practice
is especially risky under your Code. Neither Code tells us what
to do if privilege conflicts with this rule. What if there is a
privilege surrounding parts of this file? (The most common
privileges invoked here might be the privilege for the attorney's
work-product and the attorney-client communications privilege;
but other privileges are also conceivable.) The rules themselves are silent on this question. I would assume you've waived
privilege by giving the file to a witness to prepare himself. (We
have one cryptic and inconclusive reference to this problem in
our legislative history of the rule.)
I suggest that you don't prepare lay witnesses in this fashion
either. I know there's a tendency to do that sometimes if you
think the witness is intelligent, but the same risk applies.
19-CR
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There is another practice, too, I would like to mention, which
is affected by the new rules. Suppose that you have an expert
witness and again you want to save time and money, yours and
the client's, and you don't want to work with the witness extensively before trial. So you tell him to sit in the courtroom
and listen to the other witnesses as they testify. That will give
him a good picture of the case and then he can give his opinion
on the standi based upon what he's heard. The difficulty is, you
might run up against the sequestration rule. Both your Code
and ours have a sequestration rule that provides that witnesses
may not listen to each other. If a request is made, sequestration is mandatory; the judge has no discretion. The mandatory
feature is odd. Under former law the judge had discretion.
The theme of the Code in general is discretion. Yet here, where
discretion would be appropriate, the Code removes the judge's
discretion. (Your rule is more precise than ours in one respect:
it extends sequestration to provide for an order that a witness
shall not be informed by other persons what the witnesses in
the courtroom said. That is a logical extension of the sequestration rule. If we are going to bar witnesses from sitting in
the courtroom, we should also instruct that they are not to be
informed of what went on in the courtroom secondhand. Our
rule does not expressly state the latter, so it is possible one
might circumvent our sequestration rule by informing the witness out in the hall what is going on in the courtroom. A ques,.
tion can be raised also as to the permissibility of a witness
reading transcripts, attending depositions, etc.)
This sequestration rule might bar your expert from sitting
in and listening to witnesses. There is an exception to the
sequestration rule under both Codes, for the situation where
it is "essential" that the witness sit in. But I can see a judge
taking the position that there are other ways for your expert
to testify. For example, the expert can be given a hypothetical
question. So it is not "essential" that he sit in. Furthermore,
the attorney may not need the expert's advice throughout the
case because it may not be a very technical case. So his presence in the courtroom isn't "essential" in that sense. And
the point your expert is going to testify on may not be a critically central point. So it is not "essential" in that sense either.
Therefore be might well be barred from the courtroom.
I would suggest that the way around this is to argue that the
opinion and expert rules, which I addressed earlier, actually

contemplate this efficient economical way of presenting expert
testimony. If you want to get away from the hypothetical
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question, as those rules attempt to do, one of the best ways to
do it is to let the expert sit in and hear the facts. I would
suggest that the policy of those rules should supervene and
override the policy of the sequestration rule in this kind of
case. Anyway, the policy of the sequestration rule is to prevent
fact witnesses from influencing each other, a danger that is
not really present here.
One other practical effect that the rules have had on the
practising lawyer, that I should mention, is that now lawyers
are finding it more important than ever to obtain and discover
previous statements of witnesses. The taking of or search for
such statements becomes a critical kind of homework, a critical
kind of pre-trial investigation and discovery. For now a case
can be won or lost on those previous statements, because previous statements of witnesses are admissible substantively, affirmatively, under the new Codes. Before, that usage of them
would have been inadmissible hearsay. Under former law all
they could be used for was impeachment and credibility. Impeachment and credibility are important but not as tremendously important as being able to use them substantively as
well as for impeachment and credibility. So it's doubly importtant to get those pre-trial statements. I submit to you that
my experience has been that this provision favours the prosecution. When you have the burden of proof to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, the distinction between substantive
use and credibility or ,impeachment use becomes very important. And the prosecution is in a marvellous position to get
former statements of witnesses, to use the grand jury and investigation to get former statements of witnesses. The prosecutors have seen the opportunity under the new Code and
are seizing it.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN CODE

Now I want to talk about background: how our Code came
to be, what courts it governs, that sort of thing.
On 1st July 1915, about a year and a half ago, our federal
courts, not our state courts, went under this new system of
evidence, the new Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern in
all civil and criminal cases. There is verylittle distinction made
in the new rules between civil and criminal cases.
These new rules replaced our uncodified system of common
law evidence rulings in federal courts, which rulings often
varied from district to district and circuit to circuit, penalizing
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the attorney who ventured to practise outside his home territory and inhibiting the rotation of judges amongst the federal
courts around the country. On evidence matters, sometimes
the federal courts resorted to state precedent, sometimes to
federal precedent, sometimes to a mixture. This was the situation before the Code. The law was hard to find and older attorneys familiar with local peculiarities had a definite advantage over newcomers. I venture to say this situation that
I've sketched in the United States before the Code is probably
the situation that exists here in Canada now, to a somewhat
lesser degree.
The new rules in the United States only govern proceedings
in federal courts. But they govern virtually all proceedings in
federal courts. Federal courts in our system entertain basically three types of cases: (1) criminal violations of federal
statutes, i.e., statutes passed by Congress in areas that our
constitution specially gives over to the federal legislature (the
Congress), such as the federal income tax or the regulation of
interstate commerce, including such things as securities law,
anti-trust and the regulation of common carriers; (2) civil
cases that involve what is called a federal question, e.g., civil
suits under any of the congressional statutes that I have just
mentioned, or a suit involving our constitution; and (3) civil
cases that do not involve any federal congressional or federal
constitutional law and by all rights would be in a state court
but for the fact that the parties are citizens of different states.
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern all of these cases in
federal courts. Virtually all other cases are in state courts.
These include, generally speaking, criminal violations of stateenacted statutes, ordinary civil tort, contract and property suits,
matters of family law and ordinary commercial litigation. Now,
the state courts are not bound by the new Federal Rules of
Evidence but six of the states have recently enacted evidence
codes similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence and three more
are very close to doing so. Since these codes are patterned on
the Federal Rules of Evidence, they should facilitate the ability of state practitioners to function in federal courts and vice
vice versa, and I think that is an important and salutary byproduct.
I should add that state judges in states that are not adopting
the codes are nevertheless using the Federal Rules of Evidence
in an advisory capacity as a sort of textbook. Federal courts
were doing this before the formal enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and federal administrative tribunals are
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doing it today, even though the administrative tribunals are not
formally covered by the new rules. Eventually they may adopt
some rules of their own very like these.
What is the background of evidence codification in the United
States? The literature of the early 1930's reveals that scholars
and practitioners in appreciable numbers in the United States
found it deplorable that each state and each federal circuit
seemed to have its own common law of evidence even though
they shared a common core. This dissatisfaction with the existing system led to the drafting, in the next several decades,
of two documents: the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, by two prestigious groups of academicians and lawyers. These groups were the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws respectively. These two groups are prestigious, essentially private or semi-private organizations dedicated
to law reform. The Model Code was regarded as somewhat
radical in its proposals and therefore the Uniform Rules of
Evidence were drafted to be more practical and superseded it,
while preserving much that was good from it. Your Code incorporates several of the features of the Model Code, even
some superceded ones, as well as of the Uniform Rules (and, of
course, the English reforms). These Codes, particularly the
Uniform Rules, were recommended by their drafters to the
states and the federal government for adoption, but very few
states formally subscribed, although judges have often used
them as influential textbook-type statements.
In the late 1960's California did its own thorough-going revision and codification of its own evidence law, using, principally, the Uniform Rules as a point of departure. But the final
California product made many modifications.
In 1961 the federal people got into the act. The formal administrative organ of the federal courts, known as the Judicial
Conference, issued a report concluding that a uniform body of
federal rules of evidence was desirable for federal courts. In
1965 the Chief Justice of the United States therefore appointed
a drafting committee known as the Advisory Committee which
between 1968 and 1972 circulated to the bench and bar for
comments two successive drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The principal difference between the two drafts was
in the hearsay rule. The first draft just about abolished the
hearsay rule, and in this respect it is somewhat similar to your
proposed Code. Th·is met with considerable opposition on the
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part of the practising bar, and so a second draft came out that
substantially reinstated the hearsay rule, but in· considerably
eroded form compared with its common law contours.
Representatives of nearly every aspect of trial-related law
were on the Advisory Committee - academicians, judges, civil
and criminal trial lawyers from both sides of the case, etc.
Their drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence owe an appreciable debt to the Uniform Rules and to the California Code. Indeed, some of the same drafters of the three earlier codes also
sat on the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee.
In November 1972 the drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence seemed to be ready for finality, and so the Supreme
Court of the United States approved the draft for use in all
federal courts, to take effect automatically without further
enactment on the following 1st July, which would be 1st July
1973.
But then the rules hit a snag. Before their automatic effective date, Congress got into the act. Congress suspended
the rules until Congress could take a closer look at them and
examine each of them in detail. Congress's dissatisfaction centered primarily on the privilege and hearsay provisions. Some
congressmen still didn't like it that the hearsay rule was being restricted. The trial lawyers in Congress loved the old
hearsay rule and didn't want to see it restricted the way these
rules did (and your Code does even more).
Let me examine the problem Congress had with privileges,
which was probably the principal problem. The Supreme Court
draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence prescribed an exclusive
list of privileges much like the ones in your proposed Code.
Congress felt that such an approach did not defer enough to
the state law of privileges, which many congressmen thought
should apply not only in state courts but in federal courts
as well. After all, they argued, states have reasons, policies,
for having privileges,. For example, lawyer-client privilege.
States want to encourage state lawyers and state clients to
communicate. Or doctor-patient privilege. The states want
to encourage state doctors and state patients to communicate
fully in the interests of better health care in the state. They
won't communicate fully if they know there's no privilege
shouJd the matter get into a federal court. There's a great
likelihood matters do get into federal courts. So what good
does it do for the state to have a privilege if the federal court
doesn't respect it? That was the argument.
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In addition, the list of privileges failed to contain some of
the privileges that were favoured by many congressmen. A
general physician-patient privilege was not there. A general
privilege covering interspousal communications in civil and
criminal cases was not there. There was no journalist privilege.
Additionally, the draft contained a broad governmental executive information privilege (almost identical to the one in
your proposed Code)· and this really irritated the congressmen,
who were at that time chafing under President Nixon's excessive claims of executive privilege. Some libertarian congressmen felt this broad view of governmental privilege was especially bad because ·it went hand in hand with a restriction,
elsewhere in the draft, of the personal privileges like the husThe rules
band-and-wife and doctor-and-patient privileges.
seemed to be broadening governmental privilege while narrowing personal privileges. You see, the draft did not provide
for privileging confidential private citizen relationships except
for a very narrow list of specifically enumerated ones. It was
not like your Code, which does privilege confidential professional and family relationships quite generally. I might say
that your draft would not have satisfied these congressmen because even though your draft does privilege family and professional relationships, it does so only in a half-way fashion.
It grants a qualified privilege. The judge can balance various
factors to see whether he wants to accord a privilege or not. I
submit to you that this really does not effectively foster the
policies behind the privileges. The purpose of these privileges
is, I assume, largely to encourage full communications. Are
people going to be encouraged to communicate when they know
that they may or ·may not have a privilege, depending upon
what a judge rules? I do not think so. I think if you really
want to encourage them to communicate, you have got to tell
them that they definitely have a privilege.
The height of the Watergate affair was a very bad time to
put forth a draft with a broad executive privilege. Furthermore, it was probably a Watergate-engendered sensitivity that
made Congress reluctant to cede any power to any other branch
of government, whether it be to the executive or the judiciary.
Thus Congress was not about to allow the judiciary to unilaterally adopt rules of evidence without Congress getting into the
picture. Especially was this so since many of the matters in
the Code, such as privileges and other provisions, especially
provisions applying to criminal cases, were perceived to affect
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matters outside technical courtroom conduct, possibly reaching into fundamental liberties in the daily activities of citizens.
For these reasons Congress wanted to play a role. Overlaying it all was a feeling that perhaps codification was not needed, but this did not prevail. New areas of controversy surfaced
once Congress opened the rules, but finally, after a House draft,
a Senate draft and a compromise draft, the rules were enacted
and became effective on 1st July 1975. In broad outline they
were about 90 per cent what the Supreme Court draft had
provided anyway. They are also very like your Code. About
80 per cent attempts to codify the common law. But you can't
codify the common law in the United States. It has many
different stands, many conflicting views. In most cases our
Code took the majority view; but in many it codifies a minority view. There is very little that is made up out of whole
cloth and brand new. Privileges were, under the final enactment, left to common law or to state law, depending on the
kind of case; and a compromise was reached cutting back on
liberalization of the hearsay rule.
I hope in the time allotted that I have given you at least
the general flavour of our Code and a hint of what you can
expect from yours based upon our experience. I thank you
very much for your indulgence and for inviting me to such an
informative and splendidly organized program.
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